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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. dairy exports in 2009 fell sharply from 2008, but were still the third highest on record. U.S. dairy imports 
also fell, but only by about a third as much as exports. As a result, the U.S. dairy trade surplus went from more than 
$1 billion in 2008 to $100 million in 2009.
Nonfat dry milk/skim milk powder and butter exports dropped the most, together accounting for three-quarters 
of the overall loss in export value. Exports of whey and lactose—particularly important to Wisconsin—were up on 
volume, but down in value due to much lower world prices. 
The U.S. exported dairy products to 153 countries in 2009. Mexico was the largest export market, accounting 
for almost 30 percent of total export value. Exports to Asia added another 30 percent of total value. China was the 
leading Asian destination, with 6 percent of total U.S. dairy exports.
Cheese again led all import items, at just over $1 billion. Imports of high protein milk powders (casein and milk 
protein concentrate) added another $456 million. The volume of cheese imports continued to follow a downward 
trend that began in 2004. Cheese export volume fell by 52,000 MT (24 percent) over that time as a result of U.S. 
cheesemakers increasing production of varieties once available only from overseas sources. MPC imports have 
also moderated as domestic production has picked up.
The European Union—the primary source of cheese imports—accounted for about 40 percent of total U.S. 
dairy import value in 2009. New Zealand was the largest supplier of MPC and casein. 
U.S. dairy export prospects in 2010 are promising. World demand for dairy products is strengthening with solid 
real GDP growth in important U.S. export markets. World milk supply is expected to show a 1.0-1.5 percent gain 
over 2009, but most of the anticipated gain in milk production will come from China and India. China is far from 
self-sufficient in milk production and will continue to be a major importer. India also supplies less milk than it can 
use domestically, but is essentially a closed market to U.S. dairy products. Overhanging stocks from large U.S. and 
EU intervention purchases in 2009 could negatively affect world prices, but we expect 2010 U.S dairy exports to 
increase about 20 percent in value over 2009.
Trade policy initiatives remained firmly on the back burner in the U.S. and in many other major trading nations 
in 2009. The recession brought on a 12 percent drop global trade in 2009, the sharpest decline since the end of War 
II. In this environment, many governments and trade policy officials were more concerned with helping their coun-
tries weather the global financial crisis and protecting domestic markets than with trade expansion efforts. 
New thinking has emerged in government and trade policy circles that could affect U.S. dairy trade. This is 
because negotiations for the WTO Doha Round—which began in 2001—appear likely to be abandoned. Unfor-
tunately, the new thinking has produced options that are exceedingly complex and are unlikely to be acceptable 
to many trading nations. However, a new proposal to make the WTO dispute settlement machinery more “user-
friendly” appears to hold promise. 
The lack of progress on agricultural trade reform is not good news for the efficient and increasingly export-
oriented U.S. dairy industry.
U.S. DAIRY TRADE SITUATION AND OUTLOOK: 2010
Edward V. Jesse and William D. Dobson1
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TRADE UPDATE2
U.S. Dairy Exports
Both the value and volume of U.S. dairy exports in 
2009 were off sharply from 2008, victims of the global 
economic collapse that began in the fall of 2008. Over-
all, volume was down only 15 percent, but much lower 
world prices pushed the value of dairy exports down 
by 40 percent. 
Among major export items, the largest drop-offs 
were in nonfat dry milk/skim milk powder and butter. 
The loss in NDM/SMP export value accounted for 62 
percent of the total export value loss; butter 13 per-
cent. On the positive side, exports of whey and lac-
tose were up nearly 10 percent on volume, but down in 
value by one-sixth due to lower prices. Fresh milk and 
cream and frozen dairy products showed small gains 
in both value and volume.
Three categories—whey and derivatives, nonfat dry 
milk and skim milk powder, and cheese—made up 
more than two-thirds of export value in 2009 (Figure 
1). This overall proportion has been fairly stable over 
time.
The U.S. exported dairy products to 153 countries 
in 2009 (Figure 2). Mexico was by far the largest sin-
gle-country market, accounting for 28 percent of total 
dairy export value. Canada was in second place at 16.5 
percent. U.S. exports to Mexico have been growing 
rapidly, but dropped sharply in 2009 due to an espe-
cially troubled Mexican economy. U.S. dairy exports 
to Canada have been relatively stable, and are about 
matched  by  Canadian  dairy  exports  to  the  United 
States.
2 Dairy trade statistics shown in this section are derived exclusively from data drawn from the Foreign Agricultural Service Global
Agricultural Trade System (GATS): http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx
Product Group
2008 2009 Percent Change
$ MT $ MT % MT
Whey/Lactose 682,501 521,185 568,287 571,687 -16.7 9.7
NDM/SMP 1,379,462 391,165 519,977 248,829 -62.3 -36.4
Cheese-All 569,267 131,202 430,411 108,494 -24.4 -17.3
Misc. Food Preps 232,421 103,871 197,748 86,079 -14.9 -17.1
Fresh Milk & Cream 41,052 48,718 44,259 51,121 7.8 4.9
Infant Formula 122,741 31,409 122,305 31,008 -0.4 -1.3
Concentrated Milk Proteins 165,284 33,570 93,466 26,317 -43.5 -21.6
Ice Cream/Frozen 57,355 25,330 59,525 25,530 3.8 0.8
Butter/Butterfat 240,945 80,945 63,732 23,396 -73.5 -71.1
WMP 105,035 40,459 47,090 23,085 -55.2 -42.9
Milk-Based Drinks 32,770 15,445 37,285 19,189 13.8 24.2
Condensed/Evaporated 42,853 19,731 23,858 14,125 -44.3 -28.4
Cultured/Fermented 49,392 5,684 24,871 6,662 -49.6 17.2
TOTAL* 3,721,078 1,448,714 2,232,814 1,235,521 -40.0 -14.7
* Totals do not include exports of rennet, and casein glues or the value of donated dairy products.
TABLE 1. U.S. Dairy Exports, 2009 With ComparisonsU.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook: 2010
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Several East Asian countries collectively accounted 
for about the same percentage of U.S. dairy export 
value as Canada. Within the East Asian group, coun-
tries ranked by percentage of regional export value 
were  China,  Japan,  Korea  and  Taiwan.  Within  this 
group, China increased its imports of U.S. dairy prod-
ucts six-fold between 2000 and 2009, while Japanese 
imports  increased  by  20  percent.  Southeast  Asian 
countries, principally the Philippines, Indonesia, Viet-
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FIGURE 1. U.S. Exports of Dairy Products, 2009
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percent of U.S. dairy exports in 2009. Over the last 10 
years, U.S. dairy exports to Southeast Asia increased 
from $80 million to $280 million.
Dairy Imports
U.S imports of dairy products were valued at about 
$2.2 billion in 2009, down $500 million from 2008. 
As usual, cheese was the largest dairy import item 
in terms of value, at just over $1 billion. Imports of 
casein/caseinates and MPC added another $456 mil-
lion (Figure 3).
The  20-year  trend  in  the  volume  of  U.S.  cheese 
imports is shown in Figure 4. Following implementa-
tion of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in 1995, 
imports increased from about 150,000 tons to a peak 
of about 220,000 tons in 2002 and 2003. Since then, 
the volume of cheese imported into the U.S. has fallen 
steadily.  While  several  factors  likely  underlie  this 
trend, an important one is import substitution—U.S. 
cheesemakers  are  making  more  of  the  cheeses  that 
were once only available from other countries.
Trends in the volume of imports of casein/casein-
ates and MPC are shown in Figure 5. Casein imports 
appear to be trending downward in this decade, but 
with  considerable  variability.  Imports  were  record 
high in 2008 and the lowest in 15 years in 2009. MPC 
imports increased steadily from 1995 through 2000 
and then fell off sharply in 2001. MPC imports again 
trended upward though 2006, but never hit the 2000 
high water mark and appear to be trending downward. 
This is likely because of substantial increases in U.S. 
production of MPC. In 2009, USDA reported MPC 
production (for the first time) at about 42,000 MT. 
Imports were 52,000 MT. It appears that more MPC is 
being used in the U.S. and that an increasing share of 
that use is from domestic production.
Measured in value, the European Union (EU) was 
the  largest  supplier  of  U.S.  dairy  imports  in  2009, 
mostly  in  the  form  of  cheese  (Figure  6).  Italy  and 
France accounted for about half of the EU cheese ship-
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New Zealand was the second leading supplier of 
U.S. dairy imports measured in value. About 80 per-
cent of dairy product shipments from New Zealand 
were  MPC  and  casein.  Canada  was  in  third  place, 
shipping mostly value-added food products containing 
dairy ingredients.
Trade Balance
The U.S. maintained a dairy trade surplus in 2009, 
though at $100,000, just barely (Figure 7). To drama-
tize the drop in export value of $1.5 billion, note that 
this decrease was substantially larger than the annual 
value of dairy exports during 1993-2003. 
But rather than focus on the fall, it may be more 
instructive  to  examine  the  heights  from  which  the 
fall occurred. The two-year period, 2007-08, was an 
anomaly for U.S. dairy exports, characterized by very 
high world market prices and limited supplies of dairy 
products—particularly skim milk powder—from U.S. 
competitors.  U.S.  dairy  export  opportunities  were 
unprecedented. From a longer-term perspective, 2009 
exports are on trend with 2004-2006, that despite low 
world market prices in 2009. So it is fair to say that 
2009 was a decent year for U.S. dairy exports; 2007 
and 2008 were extraordinary years.
Recent Developments
After falling by about two-thirds from their peak 
levels in 2007 and 2008, world prices for the three 
major U.S. dairy export items stabilized in mid-2009 
and then rose through the end of the year (Figure 8). 
Since the beginning of 2010, SMP and cheese prices 
have fallen back some, but whey prices have remained 
firm at about $1,000/MT. World prices for all three 
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Measured in value, U.S. dairy exports have, indeed, 
picked up (Figure 9). Export value has been increas-
ingly  above  year-previous  levels  since  November 
2009. In January 2010, export value was 27 percent 
higher than January 2009.
U.S. Trade Prospects for 20103 
Higher world prices alone should pull U.S. dairy 
export  value  in  2010  above  2009;  by  how  much 
depends on export volume. And that depends on the 
nature of world demand for dairy products and the 
supply available from major exporting countries.
Global dairy demand will improve over 2009 as 
recovery  from  the  world-wide  economic  recession 
proceeds.  The  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
projects strong rates of growth—especially in compar-
ison to anemic U.S. GDP growth—in 2010 and 2011 
in  those  countries  that  have  recently  accounted  for 
most of U.S. dairy exports (Figure 10). Note in par-
ticular the real GDP growth projected for Mexico and 
China, two of the U.S.’s largest customers.
The  world  milk  supply  outlook  is,  as  usual, 
mixed.  U.S.  milk  production  in  2010  is  expected 
to be even with or fractionally below 2009. Very 
low milk prices combined with elevated feed prices 
yielded losses for most U.S. dairy farmers. Espe-
cially  hard-hit  were  western  producers,  who  pur-
chase most of their feed. The financial fall-out from 
negative cash flow and large equity losses is still 
uncertain.
New Zealand, the leading world dairy exporter, is 
expected to show about a 2 percent gain in milk pro-
duction for its marketing year ending in May 2010, 
while Australian production will likely be down about 
1 percent. 
EU milk production in 2010 will about match 2009. 
EU milk quotas for the marketing year beginning April 
1 will be increased 1 percent, but few EU members are 
expected to utilize the extra quota. Quotas are slated 





































































































































































FIGURE 9. U.S. Dairy Export Value by Month
3 The observations in this section represent an amalgamation of outlook information from several sources, but rely heavily on [10].U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook: 2010
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After falling sharply below trend in 2009, China’s 
milk production is expected to jump by 10 percent in 
2010. This will still leave Chinese milk production 4 
million MT under its peak of 35.3 million MT in 2007 
and well under production necessary to meet growing 
demand for dairy products.
In  South America, Argentina  well  likely  expand 
milk production marginally. Brazil could increase out-
put by 5 percent, continuing its rapid five-year rate of 
growth.
Adding to dairy products manufactured from 2010 
milk production are carryover stocks from 2009. While 
commercial stocks are not oppressive, the EU and the 
U.S. are holding large public stocks from intervention 
purchases made last year. The U.S. has only nonfat dry 
milk in storage, and that stock is dwindling rapidly 
with allocations to special uses. But at the end of 2009, 
the EU held about 250,000 MT of skim milk powder 
and 75,000 MT of butter in storage [1]. These stocks 
“overhang” the market in the sense of limiting upward 
price movements.
Considering the aggregate of world dairy demand 
and  supply  factors,  the  outlook  for  U.S.  exports  is 
quite positive. USDA is currently (March 2010) fore-
casting a 12 percent increase in the volume of U.S. 
exports (using 60/40 Skim/Fat milk conversion to milk 
equivalent) [11]. December 2009 USDA product fore-
casts showed 2010 cheese exports up 7 percent, but-
ter exports up almost 100 percent, and nonfat dry milk 
exports up 16 percent [10]. Since export prices should 
remain above 2009, these projected increases in export 
volume suggest even larger gains in export value. 
The bottom line: expect U.S. dairy export value in 
2010 to be in the range of $2.7-3.0 billion.
Trade Policy Outlook for 2010
Little has changed in the past year regarding the 
dairy trade policy outlook. Therefore, this section will 
be brief. In summary, trade policy initiatives remained 
firmly on the back burner in the U.S. and in many 
other major trading nations in 2009. U.S. trade policy 
















* Source is International Monetary Fund. 
Data drawn from interactive website: 
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm 
FIGURE 10. Projected Growth in Real GDP*Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-1  11
U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook: 2010
initiatives are likely to remain subdued in the run-up to 
the 2010 elections.
It is no surprise that few trade policy expansion ini-
tiatives occurred in 2009 and early 2010. In a world 
battered by recession, global trade fell by 12 percent in 
2009, the sharpest decline since the end of World War 
II [7]. In this economic environment, many govern-
ments and trade policy officials were more concerned 
with helping their countries weather the global finan-
cial crisis and protecting domestic markets than with 
trade expansion efforts. 
Fortunately, protectionist measures taken by gov-
ernments  during  the  recession  were  less  draconian 
than forecasted. According to the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO), protectionist measures—while still 
a problem—began to decline in the fourth quarter of 
2009 [9]. 
Fading Hopes for the Doha Round 
of WTO Negotiations
New thinking has emerged in government and trade 
policy circles that could affect U.S. dairy trade. This is 
because negotiations for the WTO Doha Round, which 
began in 2001, appear likely to wither away and be 
abandoned. 
Why the pessimism about the Doha Round? The 
Doha Round trade ministerials, mini-ministerials and 
negotiating sessions held in Cancun, Mexico (2003), 
Geneva,  Switzerland  (2004),  Paris,  France  (2005), 
Hong  Kong,  China  (2005),  Geneva,  Switzerland 
(2006), Potsdam, Germany (2007), and Geneva, Swit-
zerland (2008) all ended in collapse or stalemate. This 
is not an enviable record. And there is scant evidence 
that  renewed  negotiations  will  be  more  successful. 
Thus, realism regarding the dismal prospects for the 
Doha Round has emerged, and new options are being 
considered. 
From the U.S. perspective, market access for agri-
cultural products has been a big sticking point in the 
Doha Round negotiations. Recall that the 2008 Doha 
Round  negotiations  collapsed  partly  because  U.S. 
negotiators  objected  to  special  safeguards  and  dif-
ferential tariff arrangements insisted upon by India, 
China and certain other nations. The special safeguards 
would allow tariff increases in India, China, and other 
developing  nations  to  protect  farmers  from  import 
surges or other developments that push down prices. 
U.S. negotiators argued that the bar was set too low by 
India and China and would allow tariff increases after 
small price reductions such as those that occur when 
prices fall seasonally by larger than normal amounts. 
Many WTO members claim that the doubtful future 
for  the  Doha  Round  WTO  negotiations  is  caused 
partly by U.S. foot-dragging. Critics correctly point 
out that when the U.S.—a major player in trade pol-
icy—declines  to  push  for  reform,  nothing  much  of 
substance happens in WTO trade negotiations. 
The Obama Administration has shown little enthu-
siasm for pushing for rapid completion of the Doha 
Round. Many in the U.S. agricultural sector were dis-
appointed with gains in market access achieved after 
completion of the Uruguay Round WTO agreement in 
the mid-1990s. Accordingly, after previous negotiating 
sessions for the Doha Round collapsed, representatives 
of many U.S. agricultural organizations were heard to 
utter: “No deal is better than a bad deal.” Officers of 
both agricultural and non-agricultural businesses also 
questioned the need for a new WTO agreement, point-
ing out that before the 2008-2009 global recession, 
international  trade  had  continued  to  expand  in  the 
absence of a new WTO agreement. Finally, U.S. labor 
unions fear that member job losses might accompany 
a Doha Round agreement. With such a weak back-
drop of support, there is little incentive for the Obama 
Administration to help move the Doha Round WTO 
negotiations off the back burner. 
Moreover, even if the U.S. favored pushing for rapid 
completion of a Doha Round agreement, the Obama 
Administration may lack the means to bring about this 
result. Specifically, the Administration lacks the Trade 
Promotion Authority (fast-track negotiating authority) 
needed to bring any Doha Round WTO Agreement 
to an up-or-down vote by the U.S. Congress with no 
modification  of  the  provisions.  Many  other  trading 
nations fear that in the absence of fast-track negotiat-
ing authority the Congress will tinker with agreed up 
provisions. Thus, they are reluctant to complete nego-
tiations with the U.S. if the President lacks fast-track 
negotiating authority. 
U.S. reluctance to vigorously support completing 
the Doha Round does not mean that the U.S. attaches 
little importance to trade expansion. Indeed, President U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook: 2010
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Obama in his State of the Union address on January 
27, 2010, set a goal of supporting two million new 
American  jobs  by  doubling  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural exports in the next five years [5, 6]. The 
export expansion is to be achieved partly via efforts 
of key federal agencies (USDA, USTR, Commerce, 
Small Business Administration, Export-Import Bank 
and other agencies) that will participate in a National 
Export Initiative. 
Of  course,  it  may  be  premature  to  write  off  the 
Doha  Round WTO  negotiations  as  doomed  to  fail-
ure. Death sentences have been pronounced before for 
other GATT (predecessor to the WTO) negotiations 
only to see those earlier negotiating rounds resurrected 
and agreements reached. Moreover, the Doha Round 
of multilateral negotiations has determined champi-
ons. Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, continues 
to point out the substantial advantages of completing 
the Doha Round and encourages trading nations to try 
once more to reach agreement. Lamy noted, in particu-
lar, that “…the multilateral trading system has proven 
its sturdiness as a bulwark against runaway protec-
tionism (during the recent recession) [7].” In addition, 
Ambassador  David  Walker  of  New  Zealand,  chair-
man of agricultural negotiations for the Doha Round, 
pointed out that useful consultations were carried out 
in  early  February,  2010  on  remaining  Doha  Round 
issues relating to the three pillars of agricultural trade 
liberalization; namely export subsidies, trade-distort-
ing internal support for agriculture, and market access 
[12]. 
The expertly-staffed Food and Agricultural Trade 
Policy Council described the status of Doha Round 
WTO negotiations in late 2009 as follows [2, p. 11]: 
While governments were not able to conclude the 
Doha  Round  in  2008,  substantial  progress  was 
made in the agricultural agenda. Agreement has 
been reached to completely eliminate all forms of 
export subsidies and to significantly reduce trade 
distorting domestic support…On market access the 
situation  is  less  satisfactory.  Hope  for  sweeping 
across the board tariff cuts has been replaced by a 
realization that the outcome will be more complex. 
A number of flexibilities have been introduced into 
the negotiating texts. 
The Trade Policy Council describes effects of the con-
troversial flexibilities in these terms: “The acceptance of 
sensitive products; special agricultural safeguard; special 
safeguard mechanism for developing countries as well 
as ‘tailor-made’ provisions for exemptions for a number 
of countries, both developed and developing, will allow 
substantial deviations from the full implementation of 
the tariff reduction formula [2, p. 11].” The Trade Policy 
Council concluded that this complex array of safeguards 
and exemptions will “…seriously reduce, and in many 
cases prevent, real improvements in market access now 
and in the future if they become permanent fixtures of 
the Agreement on Agriculture [2, p. 11].” The scope of 
the safeguards and exemptions suggests that these provi-
sions will continue to be an important sticking point for 
U.S. agricultural negotiators under the Doha Round. 
There is clear recognition that bilateral trade agree-
ments  and  regional  trade  agreements  (RTAs)  will 
proliferate as a result of the uncertain future and pos-
sible failure of the Doha Round. Globally, hundreds 
of these agreements already exist and many more are 
under consideration. The effectiveness of one RTA, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
for expanding U.S. dairy exports to Mexico is well 
known. By reducing Mexico’s tariffs on U.S. dairy 
imports to zero, the NAFTA has helped to make Mex-
ico the largest market for U.S. dairy exports, a market 
that accounted for 26 percent of the total value of U.S. 
dairy exports during 2004-2008 [4]. 
U.S. dairy firms are not the only beneficiaries of a 
free trade agreement entered into by Mexico. Mexico 
in 1999 entered into an agreement with Chile that pro-
vided lower tariffs for Chilean exports of dairy prod-
ucts to Mexico [4]. Fonterra of New Zealand benefited 
from this agreement since a Chilean firm owned by 
Fonterra sells cheese and other dairy products to Mex-
ico under preferential tariff terms. 
In  noteworthy  recent  negotiations,  the  European 
Union (EU) in early 2010 entered into negotiations 
with Vietnam, a country with 86 million people and 
a $100 billion economy [8]. The EU hopes to expand 
sales of European cheeses, wine, pharmaceuticals and 
cars to Vietnam under the agreement. 
In  an  environment  where  a  Doha  Round  WTO 
agreement is unlikely to be reached the U.S. may need 
to  be  more  aggressive  in  negotiating  bilateral  and 
RTAs if the country is to expand export markets for Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-1  13
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agricultural and non-agricultural products. President 
Obama and U.S. Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, are 
of course aware of this competitiveness issue. In his 
2010 State of the Union message, President Obama 
spoke of bringing bilateral trade agreements already 
negotiated with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea 
to the U.S. Congress for ratification. Noting the impor-
tance of these agreements to U.S. agricultural exports, 
Trade Representative Kirk quoted a U.S. Farm Bureau 
Federation  estimate  showing  that  “…U.S.  farm 
exports to Korea, Colombia, and Panama will increase 
annually by almost $3 billion after full implementation 
of these FTAs, with gains spread across a wide range 
of U.S. agricultural products [6].” However, it is not 
clear  whether  long-standing  sticking  points  relating 
to these agreements will be resolved in time to bring 
these agreements to the Congress for a vote in 2010. 
New Thinking on Trade Agreements 
The  International  Food  and  Agricultural  Trade 
Council  claims  that  a  successfully  concluded  Doha 
Round still offers the greatest potential for agricultural 
trade reform at this time [2]. However, the Council 
adds that the slow pace of the Doha Round negotia-
tions has led to calls for alternative options. Briefly, 
the  complex  alternative  options  considered  by  the 
Council were as follows: 
•  Sectoral Negotiations. This item calls for a return 
to the original notion of having the WTO serve 
as a permanent negotiating forum that conducts a 
series of sectoral negotiations. This option would 
provide separate negotiations for agricultural 
products and non-agricultural products. 
Among other things, this option might simplify 
negotiations. 
•  Plurilateral Agreements. These agreements 
negotiated by a subset of WTO members would 
go into effect without the agreement of the 
entire membership. For such negotiations to 
be successful, they must include most of the 
important nations that have an interest in a 
particular rule or product. 
•  Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs): In order to have a significant impact 
on the multilateral trading system, bilateral and 
regional agreements should be between large 
trading entities. This, the Council argues, would 
encourage others to join or form other mega-
RTAs. The Council adds that WTO members also 
should consider other options to better streamline 
RTAs in the WTO system, i.e.,”multilateralizing” 
RTAs. 
•  Improve the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Procedures: Important disputes were settled 
under the current WTO machinery relating to 
the Canadian dairy export subsidies, EU sugar, 
and U.S. cotton. If the Doha Round cannot be 
successfully completed, it may be useful to 
explore ways to make the dispute settlement 
procedure more user friendly, especially for 
developing countries. 
The alternative options presented by the Council 
show the immense complexity of developing partial 
replacements for the current WTO multilateral sys-
tem. Furthermore, it is far from clear whether trading 
nations would agree to adopt the alternative options. 
Indeed, trade officials might readily conclude that it is 
more feasible to try to reach agreement on the Doha 
Round than to pursue one or more of the alternative 
options considered by the Council. 
However, making the WTO dispute settlement pro-
cedure more user friendly appears to be a worthy idea. 
Currently, it is massively expensive and time-consum-
ing for countries to employ the WTO dispute settle-
ment  machinery  to  settle  trade  disagreements.  For 
example, it took from October 1997 until May 2003 to 
move the Canadian dairy export subsidy dispute relat-
ing to Canada’s dairy pricing system from the initial 
U.S.-New Zealand WTO challenge through the final 
appeals [3]. Trading nations probably find that it is 
economically feasible to challenge only the most fla-
grant and damaging violations of WTO rules under the 
current dispute settlement system.
The bottom line: The lack of progress on agricul-
tural trade reform is not good news for the efficient 
and increasingly export-oriented U.S. dairy industry.U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook: 2010
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